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Abstract
When control systems are endowed with model-based anomaly detectors, the scale of what an attacker is able to accomplish
is constrained if an attack is to remain stealthy to the detector. This paper develops a novel framework based on geometric
sums for computing precise ellipsoidal bounds on the set of states reachable due to constrained stealthy attacks. We show
that this approach provides much more exact ellipsoidal bounds than alternative methods based on convex optimization.
The increased tightness of these bounds enables a thorough investigation into the inherent trade-off between closed-loop
performance (measured based on the ‖H‖2 gain) and security (measured based on the reachable set of the attack) through
the design of the controller and observer gain matrices in estimate-based feedback on linear time-invariant control systems.
Key words: security, resilient control, reachable set, robust control, ellipsoidal methods.
1 Introduction
The transition of modern infrastructures, such as chem-
ical refineries, power plants, or manufacturing facilities,
to computer-based technologies for supervisory control
and data transmission has revealed significant challenges
in the security of such cyber-physical systems (CPS),
despite the numerous benefits it has provided in terms
of efficiency, performance, and reliability. In the past,
adaptive, robust, and stochastic control techniques have
focused on rejecting physical disturbances, noise, and
uncertainties, often striking a necessary balance between
performance and robustness. However, with the migra-
tion of control system implementations to computer-
based Ethernet networks, control design must deal with
a new class of adversarial uncertainty injected from the
cyber layer. The presence of these “attacks” introduce
a new dimension to consider when designing control
systems. Due to their strategic nature and intent to
harm, developing design tools to harden control systems
against such cyber attacks is essential for the safe oper-
ation of these critical infrastructures.
The concept of Resilient Control introduces the notion
of control design in the presence of an attack or other
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uncertain cyber environment [1,2]. The goal of a resilient
control design is to protect the system from the risks in-
duced by malicious signals delivered to the physical pro-
cess through the cyber layer. In general, resilient control
is characterized by a trade off between security and ro-
bustness, emphasizing that a system can be fragile and
weak against cyber perturbations despite being robust
against physical uncertainties [2,3]. In this context, ro-
bustness refers to the performance of the system un-
der physical uncertainties and disturbances and security
refers to the safety of the system against malicious sig-
nals and uncertainties entering from the cyber layer. Re-
cent work in this theme includes studying the character-
istics of defining resilient estimation schemes on the con-
text of compromised sensors [4,5], or networked control
systems for the trade off between a specific performance
criteria like robustness in dynamic connectivity manage-
ment, robustness for redundancy of direct information
exchange and network’s asymptotycal and exponential
stability versus the network’s safety and security, [6,7,8].
In this paper we introduce a computational framework
based on ellipsoidal geometric tools to quantify the secu-
rity of a control system by the potential impact that a cy-
ber attacks could have. We couple these tools with meth-
ods to quantify the robustness through an Output Co-
variance Constrained (OCC) ‖H‖2 gain between noise
and output. Subject to a desired level of robustness, we
formulate optimizations (with closed-form derivatives)
to select the resilient observer and controller gains to
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yield minimal impact due to attacks. These tools are
also able to characterize the trade off between robust-
ness and security through different control designs high-
lighting, in particular, that giving up a small amount of
robustness can lead to large gains in security.
There is a mature line of control theoretic work sur-
rounding the notion of robustness, see e.g., [9,10], but
metrics for security are much less well-developed. In the
past few years, the idea of using the set of states reach-
able by an attacker as a metric for security has emerged
[11,12,13,14]. This reachable set quantifies the impact
that attacks can have on the system state - the smaller
the possible impact, the greater the security. Some work
has leveraged these reachable sets to provide a more
exacting notion of safety by quantifying the distance
to states labeled as unsafe [15,13]. Here, we model at-
tacks as additive perturbations affecting sensors mea-
surements and are propagated to the system dynamics
through output-based controllers. Therefore, we use the
reachable set of the attack as our measure of impact and
attempt to design the system in order to minimize the
size of this reachable set.
The main idea of this paper is that we characterize the
noise and attack as ellipsoidally bounded inputs, defined
as E(Qi), (see our work in [16]), to quantify the impact
(reachable set) of the attack and use this framework to
design the observer and controller gains L and K for
observer-based feedback to minimize the attack impact.
In this work, we first develop and update a recursive
algorithm proposed in [17] to a one step formula on the
geometric sum of several ellipsoidal sets. This allows us
to use the result as part of the optimization to design the
observer and controller gains to minimize the impact.
In addition, we have also presented a novel formula to
compute the exact boundary of the reachable set.
We publish this article alongside a companion paper,
which studies the same problem using different tools [14].
Instead of using geometric tools to bound the reachable
set, we use Lyapunov-type functions to derive ellipsoidal
bounds on the reachable set. The advantage of the com-
panion paper is that its approach - which has to-date
been the dominant approach, see e.g., [16,13] - yields
linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) that must be satisfied
to find ellipsoidal bounds. These LMIs can be linearized
and incorporated in efficient convex optimization prob-
lems. As we demonstrate in this paper, the convenience
of these LMI solutions come at the cost of greater conser-
vatism, which ultimately leads to a less-accurate trade
off between robustness and security.
In [13], the authors also consider a similar problem. The
approach is distinguished in three ways: (1) they design
a dynamic output feedback controller and the indepen-
dence of the controller matrices from the observer gain
(the estimator is used for detection, not for feedback)
makes the problem marginally easier to linearize; (2)
they consider a distributionally robust ‖H‖∞ constraint
for performance, in the sense that it does not incorpo-
rate information about the noise distributions; and (3)
they do not focus on characterizing the trade off inher-
ent between robustness and security.
Most notation of the paper is standard. The notation
Vn×n denotes the space of positive definite matrices of
size n. We use i, j := i, i + 1, . . . , j − 1, j to denote an
interval of integers. The single entry matrix J ijA is a ma-
trix of all zeros with the same size as matrix A whose
(i, j) entry is a one ([J ijA ]ij = 1).
2 Background
The system we consider is a discrete time stochastic lin-
ear time-invariant (LTI) system with estimate feedback
and zero mean Gaussian sensor and process noises with
known covariances,
xk+1 = Fxk +Guk + νk, (1)
yk = Cxk + ηk, (2)
where the state xk ∈ Rn, k ∈ N, evolves due to the state
update provided by the state matrix F ∈ Rn×n, the
control input uk ∈ Rm filtered by the input matrix G ∈
Rn×m, and the Gaussian process noise νk ∼ N (0, R1)
where R1 ∈ Vn×n. The output yk ∈ Rp aggregates a
linear combination, given by the observation matrix C ∈
Rp×n, of the states and the Gaussian sensor noise ηk ∼
N (0, R2) where R2 ∈ Vp×p. In addition we assume that
state matrix F is stable, the pair (F,C) is detectable
and (F,G) is stabilizable.
In this work, we consider the scenario where the actual
measurement yk can be corrupted by an additive attack,
δk ∈ Rp. At some point during the course of measure-
ment and transmission of the output to the controller,
the attack appears in the output signal, therefore the
attacked output becomes
y¯k = yk + δk = Cxk + ηk + δk. (3)
If the attacker has access to the measurements, then
it is possible for the attack δk to cancel some or all of
the original measurement yk, so an additive attack can
achieve arbitrary control over the “effective” output of
the system.
Because our system is stochastic and all states are, in
general, not observed, we employ an estimator to pro-
duce a prediction of the system behavior
xˆk+1 = Fxˆk +Guk + L(y¯k − Cxˆk), (4)
where xˆk ∈ Rn is the estimated state and the observer
gain L is designed to force system states to track the es-
timated states. This estimate is used for observer-based
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output feedback,
uk = Kxˆk, (5)
where K ∈ Rm×n denotes the controller gain matrix.
Since typically system characteristics cannot be modi-
fied, it is the observer and controller gains L and K that
give designers the ability to shape the performance of the
system, such as for stability (e.g., pole placement) and
robustness (e.g., H∞). In this paper we develop tools to
design L and K to limit the impact of attacks on control
systems.
Knowing the output may be corrupted, system operators
implement a model-based detector to identify anomalies
in the behavior of the system. Such detectors take, as
input, the sequence of residuals rk,
rk = y¯k − Cxˆk, (6)
which is the difference between what we actually receive
(y¯k) and expect to receive (Cxˆk), which evolves accord-
ing to
xk+1 = (F +GK)xk −GKek + νk (7)
ek+1 =
(
F − LC)ek − Lηk + vk − Lδk, (8)
yk = Cxk + ηk + δk, (9)
rk = Cek + ηk + δk, (10)
where ek = xk−xˆk is the estimation error. In the absence
of attacks (i.e., δk = 0), we can show that in steady-state
the rk random variable has covariance
Σ = E[rkr
T
k ] = CE[eke
T
k ]C
T + E[ηkη
T
k ],
= CPeC
T +R2,
(11)
where the steady state covariance of the estimation error
Pe = limk→∞ Pk = E[ekeTk ] is
Pe = E[eke
T
k ]
= (F − LC)E[ekeTk ](F − LC)T
+ LE[ηkη
T
k ]L
T + E[νkν
T
k ],
= (F − LC)Pe(F − LC)T + LR2LT +R1.
(12)
Here, we consider the chi-squared detector, although
similar analysis can be done with other detector choices
[18,19]. In the case of the chi-squared detector, a
quadratic distance measure zk is created to be sensitive
to changes in the variance of the distribution as well as
the expected value,
zk = r
T
k Σ
−1rk. (13)
The chi-squared detector generates alarms when the dis-
tance measure exceeds a threshold α ∈ R>0{
zk ≤ α −→ no alarm,
zk > α −→ alarm: k′ = k, (14)
such that alarm time(s) k′ are produced. The Σ−1 factor
in the definition of zk re-scales the distribution (E[zk] =
p, E[zkz
T
k ] = 2p) so that the threshold α can be designed
independent of the specific statistics (mean and covari-
ance) of the noises νk and ηk; instead, it can be selected
simply based on the number of sensors, p. Typically a
false alarm rate is chosen and α is then computed using
the cumulative distribution function of the chi-square
distribution, the regularized lower incomplete gamma
function [18].
2.1 Definition of attack
Detectors are designed to identify anomalies in the sys-
tem, and limit what the attacker is able to accomplish if
he/she wants to remain undetected. We consider a worst-
case deterministic attack in which the attacker wishes to
raise no detector alarms. While more sophisticated at-
tacks exist, the deterministic nature of this attack type
make it a ready benchmark for comparison of the tools
we develop in this paper compared with existing meth-
ods that leverage convex optimization [16,14]. This at-
tack model requires strong knowledge of and access to
the system dynamics, statistics of noises, output of the
observer (xˆk), and chi-squared detector threshold. The
goal of this stealthy attack is to construct the worst case
scenario for attack impact while remaining stealthy to
the detector.
Zero-alarm attacks employ attack sequences that main-
tain the distance measure at or below the threshold, i.e.,
zk ≤ α. These attacks generate no alarms during the
attack. To satisfy this condition we define the attack as
δk = Σ
1
2 δ¯k − (y¯k − Cxˆk) = −Cek − ηk + Σ 12 δ¯k, (15)
where δ¯k ∈ Rp is any vector such that δ¯Tk δ¯k ≤ α and Σ
1
2
is the symmetric square root of Σ (recall the attacker
has read access to the sensor, yk, and knowledge of the
estimate, xˆk). From (15),
zk = r
T
k Σ
−1rk
= (Cek + ηk + δk)
TΣ−1(Cek + ηk + δk)
= (Σ
1
2 δ¯k)
TΣ−1(Σ
1
2 δ¯k) (16)
= δ¯Tk δ¯k ≤ α. (17)
Since zk ≤ α, no alarms are raised. We will show later
(see Remark 2) that our optimization becomes indepen-
dent of the specific value of α. This implies that our op-
timization finds optimal observer and controller gains
to limit attacker impact whether the attacker aims to
be stealthy or non-stealthy, thus actually considering a
broader class of attacks than simply zero-alarm attacks.
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Figure 1. The p¯-probable ellipsoid captures a level set of the
distribution of Gaussian noise, such that drawing a sample
within the ellipsoid occurs with probability p¯ and drawing a
sample the falls outside the ellipsoid occurs with probability
1− p¯. Typically p¯ is chosen close to 1.
2.2 Truncating Noise Distributions
The tools we use in this paper to measure the attack im-
pact quantify the size of the set of states reachable by the
inputs of the system, namely the attack input and the
noise inputs. A system (even a stable system) driven by
(unbounded) Gaussian noise has an unbounded reach-
able set - while the probability of having a very large
state may be vanishingly small, it is still nonzero. In or-
der to get a practical sense of the attack impact (as a
finite reachable set), it is standard to truncate the noise
at some confidence level. We will show later (see Remark
2) that our optimization of observer and controller gains
is independent of the choice of this truncation level. This
implies that the optimal gains minimize the impact of
the attacker solely as a function of the covariances of the
noise and not the truncation bound we select.
In the absence of an attack, the system is driven by zero-
mean Gaussian noises with infinite support. Truncating
these multivariate distributions can be done with ellip-
soidal sets, which are effectively level-sets of the proba-
bility density functions such that drawing a noise sample
falling outside this ellipsoidal set occurs with probability
1− p¯ (see Figure 1), i.e.,
Pr(νTk R
−1
1 νk ≤ ν¯) = p¯, (18)
Pr(ηTk R
−1
2 ηk ≤ η¯) = p¯, (19)
for the system and measurement noise, respectively (the
values ν¯ and η¯ are called Mahalanobis distances; p¯ could
be chosen differently for each distribution, but for sim-
plicity we consider them the same).
By truncating the noises at their Mahalanobis distances,
we can then consider each of the noises as ellipsoidally
bounded random inputs, i.e., νk ∈ E(ν¯R1) and ηk ∈
E(η¯R2), where
E(R, c) = {ξ | (ξ − c)TR−1(ξ − c) ≤ 1} , (20)
with R ∈ V called the shape matrix and c the center
of the ellipsoid. When the center is the origin, we often
drop the second argument, E(R) = E(R, 0).
2.3 Reachable Set
The fact that the attack δ¯k is contained within a sphere
with nonzero volume, δ¯ ∈ E(αI), indicates the attacker
is capable of having an effect on the system while still
remaining stealthy to the detector. In order to quantify
the impact of this stealthy attack, we require a metric,
and a popular choice is the set of states reachable by the
action of the attack.
Applying the structure of the zero-alarm attack (15) to
(7), the evolution of the system dynamics can be written
as a function of the two inputs νk and δ¯k (recall ηk is
effectively canceled in the definition of δk in (15)),
ek+1 = Fek − LΣ 12 δ¯k + νk, (21)
xk+1 = (F +GK)xk −GKek + νk. (22)
In steady state, (21) and (22) become (for k ≥ 2),
ek =
k−1∑
i=1
F iνk−i − F iLΣ 12 δ¯k−i, (23)
xk =
k−1∑
i=1
F ivk−i +
(
(F +GK)i − F i)LΣ 12 δ¯k−i. (24)
To highlight the contribution of each input on the dy-
namics, we can split (21) and (22) based on the con-
tributions of νk and δ¯k, where for the estimation error,
ek = e
ν
k + e
δ¯
k, and for the state, xk = x
ν
k + x
δ¯
k,
eνk+1 = Fe
ν
k + νk, (25)
xνk+1 = (F +GK)x
ν
k −GKeνk + νk, (26)
eδ¯k+1 = Fe
δ¯
k − LΣ
1
2 δ¯k, (27)
xδ¯k+1 = (F +GK)x
δ¯
k −GKeδ¯k. (28)
Now that we have solved for xk in (24), we can start to
compute the geometry of its reachable set, which shows
the ability of the attack to change the system state.
Equation (24) shows that the overall state involves el-
lipsoidally bounded random variables δ¯k and νk. In the
following sections of this paper we show how to generate
the zero-alarm reachable state set exploiting the inde-
pendence and ellipsoidal boundedness of these random
variables. We use the geometric sum to explore all of
the states xk that are possible through all the different
realizations of νi and δ¯i over i ∈ 1, k − 1.
Definition 1 [20] The geometric (or Minkowski) sum
of two convex sets S1,S2 ⊂ Rn is
S1 ⊕ S2 =
{
s1 + s2
∣∣∣ s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2} . (29)
Note that while the geometric sum of two ellipsoids is a
convex set, it is in general not an ellipsoid.
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Lemma 1 [20] Given vector x ∈ E(Q, c), with shape
matrix Q ∈ Vn×n and mean value c ∈ Rn, then for any
linear mapping T (x) = Ax with A ∈ Rn×n the vector
ξ = T (x) = Ax lies within an ellipsoid with shape matrix
AQAT and mean value Ac, i.e., ξ ∈ E(AQAT , Ac).
For the state dynamics, this geometric sum is denoted
by Rx,k and based on (24),
Rx,k = Rνx,k ⊕Rδ¯x,k, (30)
where in steady stateRνx,k denotes the the process noise
contribution governed by (26), and Rδ¯x,k denotes the at-
tack input contribution governed by (28),
Rx,k =
k⊕
i=0
ν¯F iR1F
iT ⊕ αHiLΣLTHTi , (31)
with Hi = (F + GK)
i − F i, and ⊕ denotes geometric
sum and
⊕
denotes geometric series.
In its current form, (31) is convenient, however, remains
abstract. The next section of this paper develops tools to
analytically quantify and bound this chain of geometric
sums so that we can incorporate them into an optimiza-
tion to minimize this attack-induced reachable set.
3 Ellipsoidal Approximation of the Reachable
Set
It is important to observe that even though each term
of the geometric sum in (31) is an ellipsoid, the overall
geometric sum (and, therefore, the overall reachable set)
is, in general, not an ellipsoid. Characterizing the exact
boundary of the k-step reachable set has not appeared
in the literature, and here we capture this in Theorem
1 in Section 3.1. While characterizing the exact bound-
ary provides a precise picture of the reachable set, due
to the iterative nature of its construction, optimizing
the reachable set directly, such as through designing the
observer and controller gain matrices L and K, would
generally require blackbox optimization strategies. This
motivates us to construct an ellipsoidal approximation
of the reachable set, which is more easily integrated into
further calculation and optimization.
3.1 Ellipsoidal Approximation of a Geometric Sum
A central tool in working with geometric operations on
convex sets is the support function,
ρ(`|H) = sup
x∈H
〈`, x〉, (32)
Figure 2. Convex set H as a geometric sum of k ellipsoids.
Here the ellipsoids are decreasing in size as would be the case
for a stable system and ellipsoids generated by (31).
which can be interpreted as the largest projection of
elements of the convex set H onto the direction given by
the unit vector `. Containment of one convex set within
another convex set, H ⊂ S, is exactly captured by the
support function of the contained set being less than or
equal to the support function of the containing set over
all choices of `,
ρ(`|H) ≤ ρ(`|S), ∀` ∈ Rn. (33)
In addition, the support function of a geometric sum of
two convex sets can be expressed as the sum of their
support functions [17]. The geometric sum of k ellipsoids
centered at zero with shape matrices Q1, . . . , Qk (see
Figure 2) is then
ρ(`|H) =
k∑
i=1
ρ
(
` | E(Qi)
)
. (34)
When the convex sets of interest are ellipsoids, the sup-
port function can further be expressed as
ρ
(
` | E(Q)) = 〈`,Q`〉 12 . (35)
Therefore, the geometric sum (34) can be written as
ρ(`|H) =
k∑
i=1
〈`,Qi`〉 12 . (36)
The following result provides a closed form formula to
calculate the exact geometric sum of a finite collection
of ellipsoids based on their support functions.
Theorem 1 Consider the set of k ellipsoids character-
ized by the positive definite matrices Qi ∈ Vn×n, i ∈ 1, k.
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The exact convex shape of their geometric sum is
H =
k⊕
i=1
E(Qi) =
{
x =
k∑
i=1
〈`,Qi`〉− 12Qi`
∣∣∣∣ ‖`‖ ≤ 1
}
.
(37)
The boundary ∂H of the convex set is found when ‖`‖ = 1.
Proof: One way to interpret the support function (32)
is that ` provides the normal vector of the hyperplane
that is tangent to the convex set H at the point x. By
the definition of the geometric sum, the boundary point
x can be written as the sum of elements xi ∈ E(Qi) for
i ∈ 1, k,
x =
k∑
i=1
xi, (38)
where each xi is a boundary point on each individual
ellipsoid, i.e., the maximizer of
ρ
(
` | E(Qi)
)
= sup
ξ∈E(Qi)
〈`, ξ〉, (39)
analogous to (32). Hence, for each i ∈ 1, k, ` provides the
(unit) normal vector of the hyperplane that is tangent
to the ellipsoid E(Qi) at the point xi. The normal vector
of the ellipsoid can also be expressed as the gradient of
the level set xTi Q
−1
i xi = 1, hence,
` =
∇(xTi Q−1i xi − 1)
‖∇(xTi Q−1i xi − 1)‖
=
Q−1i xi√
xTi Q
−2
i xi
. (40)
If we use again the fact that xTi Q
−1
i xi = 1,
` =
(xTi Q
−1
i xi)Q
−1
i xi√
xTi Q
−2
i xi
= xTi
Q−1i xi√
xTi Q
−2
i xi
Q−1i xi
= xTi `Q
−1
i xi. (41)
Note that as the maximizer of (39), the projection of xi
onto ` gives the support function,
xTi ` = ρ(` | E(Qi)) = 〈`,Qi`〉
1
2 . (42)
Substituting (42) into (41) yields
` = 〈`,Qi`〉 12Q−1i xi. (43)
Finally, solving for xi and plugging these into (38) com-
pletes the proof. 
As mentioned previously, working with the convex set
H directly is challenging because for large enough k it
can be quite complicated and quantifying properties of
the exact set is difficult. In addition its dependence on
` makes it troublesome to compute the derivatives re-
quired for optimizing the set. Theorem 2 characterizes
the family of shape matrices that provide an outer el-
lipsoidal bound on the exact convex set, i.e., H ⊆ E(Q).
This result is similar to Theorem 2.7.1 in [17], which
computes the geometric sum of k ellipsoids through pair-
wise sums. The recursive approach in [17] approximates
the geometric sum of two ellipsoids with an ellipsoid on
each iteration which fundamentally restricts the choice
of the outer bound and does not provide any guarantees
on the tightness of the bound.
Theorem 2 Consider the set of k ellipsoids character-
ized by the positive definite matrices Qi ∈ Vn×n, i ∈ 1, k.
The ellipsoid E(Q) is an outer bound of their geometric
sum H = ⊕ki=1 E(Qi), i.e., H ⊆ E(Q), if,
Q =
k∑
i=1
Qi +
∑
i,j∈I
pijQi + p
−1
ij Qj (44)
where pij > 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ I = {(i, j) | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, i, j ∈
N}.
Proof: To prove that the convex set of the geometric
sum is bounded by the ellipsoid, i.e., H ⊆ E(Q), it suf-
fices to prove (33) holds between the support functions
ρ(`|E(Q)) and ρ(`|H). We first define a positive coef-
ficient pij between the shape matrices Qi and Qj and
in order to avoid redundancy assume i < j which con-
structs the set I. Given a unit vector `, we start with the
following sum of squares which is always nonnegative
∑
i,j∈I
(√
pij〈`,Qi`〉 12 −√pij−1〈`,Qj`〉 12
)2
≥ 0.
Expanding this series results in,
∑
i,j∈I
(
pij〈`,Qi`〉+ p−1ij 〈`,Qj`〉
) ≥ ∑
i,j∈I
2〈`,Qi`〉 12 〈`,Qj`〉 12 ,
and adding
∑k
i=1〈`,Qi`〉 to both sides of the inequality,
k∑
i=1
〈`,Qi`〉+
∑
i,j∈I
pij〈`,Qi`〉+ p−1ij 〈`,Qj`〉
≥
k∑
i=1
〈`,Qi`〉+
∑
i,j∈I
2〈`,Qi`〉 12 〈`,Qj`〉 12 .
allows us to complete the square on the right hand side
of the inequality. The left hand side, then, becomes the
definition of Q in (44), such that it is equal to 〈`,Q`〉.
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Figure 3. There are an infinite number of ellipsoids that are
a tight outer bound of the convex set H, each tangent to H
at different points (alternatively corresponding to different
choices of the unit vector `). A careful choice of these tangent
points provides a useful outer bound.
Therefore, 〈`,Q`〉 ≥ (∑ki=1〈`,Qi`〉 12 )2, which means,
〈`,Q`〉 12︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ
(
` | E(Q)
) ≥
k∑
i=1
〈`,Qi`〉 12︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρ(`|H)
, (45)
and the underbrace defintions come from (35) and (36).
We conclude then that H ⊆ E(Q) from (33). 
Remark 1 Although it is written in several terms in
(44), the shape matrix Q is a linear combination of the
individual shape matrices Qi, Q =
∑k
i=1 αiQi, with co-
efficients αi that are the combination of pij and p
−1
ij . If
the coefficients of the Qi are large, then it makes E(Q) a
large and loose outer bound on H. This occurs when pij
is either very large or very small (so p−1ij is large). Thus
to have a tight outer bound, which is tangent to the ex-
act sum H, the challenge is to select the definition of pij
appropriately.
3.2 Tight Ellipsoidal Approximations
Theorem 2 characterizes the family of ellipsoids that out-
erbound the reachable set, including both tight and con-
servative overapproximations of the reachable set. The
inequality in (45) becomes an equality if E(Q) touches
the convex set H in the direction of the unit vector ` -
i.e., is a tight approximation - and occurs when pij is
selected appropriately. There are an infinite number of
such tight ellipsoidal bounds (see Figure 3) and we will
show throughout this paper the advantages of the min-
imum trace ellipsoidal bound. We denote this minimum
trace ellipsoid by E(Q∗).
This ellipsoid provides analytic tractability for the com-
putation of its shape matrix which is derived in Lemma
2. In Section 5 where we design the controller and ob-
server gains, this selection also makes the subsequent
optimization to minimize the attack reachable set inde-
pendent of the noise (truncation level and distribution).
Lemma 2 Consider the set of k ellipsoids characterized
by the positive definite matricesQi ∈ Vn×n, i ∈ 1, k. The
ellipsoid E(Q∗) is a tight outer bound of their geometric
sum H = ⊕ki=1 E(Qi), i.e., H ⊆ E(Q∗), where
Q∗ =
(
k∑
i=1
√
tr(Qi)
)(
k∑
i=1
Qi√
tr(Qi)
)
. (46)
Specifically, of all the shape matrices that correspond to
ellipsoid outer bounds of H, Q∗ has the minimum trace.
Proof: Starting from the general condition on pij for
E(Q) to be an outer bound, (44), we take the trace op-
eration of both sides
tr(Q) =
k∑
i=1
tr(Qi) +
∑
i,j∈I
pijtr(Qi) + p
−1
ij tr(Qj) (47)
This makes tr(Q) a function of pij , (i, j) ∈ I. To find
the minima, we find the stationary points of tr(Q) with
respect to pij ,
∂tr(Q)
∂pij
= tr(Qi)− tr(Qj)
p2ij
= 0. (48)
with the laplacian always positive due to the positive
definiteness of each Q1, . . . , Qk shape matrices,
∇2tr(Q) = diag
 {2tr(Qj)
p3ij
}
(i,j)∈I
 > 0, (49)
where the pairs (i, j) are ordered first by i and then by
j. The solution of (48) is p∗ij =
√
tr(Qj)/tr(Qi), which
is unique due to the positive laplacian implying a global
minimum. Boundedness of the reachable set (see Section
3.3) guarantees the existence of the solution for optimal
values p∗ij . Substituting this choice of pij into (44) com-
pletes the proof. 
Our choice of the minimum trace ellipsoid differs from
the more common choice of tight ellipsoidal shape matrix
[17,20],
Q =
(
k∑
i=1
〈`,Qi`〉 12
)(
k∑
i=1
〈`,Qi`〉− 12Qi
)
, (50)
which emerges from an iterative approach to approxi-
mating the k step Minkowski sum of ellipsoids. In the
context of our more general Theorem 2, we see that this
corresponds to the choice,
pij =
〈`,Qj`〉 12
〈`,Qi`〉 12
=
ρ
(
` | E(Qj)
)
ρ
(
` | E(Qi)
) , ∀i, j ∈ I. (51)
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Now we can see that one of the most important features
of Theorem 2 (and therefore Lemma 2) is that it is able
to drop the dependence on the unit vector `, which is a
user-specified choice. Keeping ` involved, as in (50)-(51),
makes it difficult to generalize the analysis and take an-
alytic derivatives of the shape matrix in terms of the
gain matrices (in Section 5). The following result con-
firms that this choice of pij corresponding to the fam-
ily of shape matrices given by (50) does not, in general,
capture the minimum trace shape matrix in Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 Consider the set of k ellipsoids characterized
by shape matrices Qi ∈ Vn×n, i ∈ 1, k where d of these
shape matrices are linearly independent. Let Q be the set
of matrices specified by (50) over all choices of ` ∈ Rn.
If d > n, then Q∗ 6∈ Q, where Q∗ is the shape matrix of
the minimum trace ellipsoid that contains the geometric
sum H = ⊕ki=1 E(Qi).
The proof of Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix A. Note
that in our context k is typically relatively large and so
typically d > n.
3.3 A Tight Ellipsoidal Bound on the Reachable Set
The expression of the reachable set in (31) indicates that
the reachable set of the system state is a function of time,
k, and composed of contributions from both the noise
and the attack. The noise-driven portion of the system
is characterized by ellipsoids with shape matrices Qνi =
ν¯F iR1F
iT ; the attack-driven portion is characterized
by ellipsoids with shape matrices Qδ¯i = αHiLΣL
THTi ,
with Hi = (F +GK)
i − F i. Using the framework built
above, the reachable set Rx,k ⊆ E(Q∗k), where Q∗k is
given by Lemma 2 with {Qi}ki=0 = {Qνi , Qδ¯i }ki=0 (note
we introduce the subscript k to Q∗ here to explicitly
indicate the dependence on time).
The stability of the open-loop (F ) and closed-loop (F +
GK) dynamics along with the bounded inputs νk and δ¯k
imply that the set of reachable states is bounded. In Ap-
pendix B, we use these facts to also show that the min-
imum trace ellipsoidal outer bound is also bounded. In
particular, we show that the sequence {Q∗k} is Cauchy,
which suggests there exists a k∗ that satisfies an arbi-
trary level of approximation accuracy,
∥∥∥Q∗k∗ − lim
k→∞
Q∗k
∥∥∥ ≤ . (52)
This k∗ can be interpreted as the settling time of the
system. Thus, up to some -accuracy, the infinite horizon
reachable set Rx ⊆ E(Q∗), where Q∗ = limk→∞Q∗k
Q∗ =
(
k∗∑
i=0
√
αtr
(
HiLΣLTHTi
)
+
√
ν¯tr
(
F iR1F iT
))
×
(
k∗∑
i=0
αHiLΣL
THTi√
tr
(
αHiLΣLTHTi
) + ν¯F iR1F iT√
tr
(
ν¯F iR1F iT
)
)
. (53)
Beyond simply quantifying the reachable set, the goal of
this paper is to design the observer and controller gain
matrices to minimize the reachable set by minimizing
the ellipsoid E(Q∗).
From (53) but even more clearly from (23)-(24), there
is a set of trivial choices of L and K that minimize the
ellipsoidal bound and, therefore, the reachable set. In
general, K = 0 or L = 0 are always included in the set
of trivial solutions regardless of the properties of F and
G (see Appendix C for complete characterization of the
trivial set). Either of these choices (L = 0 or K = 0)
effectively cuts the feedback loop for both the attacker
and controller. Hence while these trivial choices elimi-
nate the impact of the attack on the reachable set, it also
removes the influence of the feedback controller, and we
cannot guarantee the performance of the control system
design, such as rate of stability, overshoot, and robust-
ness. Work in resilient control has already identified the
trade off between security and other metrics, so it is ex-
pected that similar exchanges are relevant to the design
of observer and controller gains. To avoid these trivial
solutions and to explore the implied trade off, we ad-
ditionally require a performance criteria to be satisfied.
Here we propose a robustness characteristic quantified
by an output covariance constrained ‖H‖2 requirement.
4 Output Covariance Constrained (OCC) ‖H‖2
Constraint
A model-based attack detection approach already lever-
ages knowledge of the system’s noise characteristics (co-
variances), hence it is fitting to use this knowledge to find
a more tailored robustness metric, which is why we use
an Output Covariance Constrained (OCC) ‖H‖2 gain
as the closed loop performance criteria [21]. We contrast
this kind of choice with ‖H‖2 and ‖H‖∞ definitions that
do not take the input covariances into account and thus
can be considered as “distributionally robust” gains from
noise-to-output. The OCC ‖H‖2 gain, which bounds the
measurement based on the covariance of input noises,
constrains a given signal hk = H1xk + H2ωk based on
the input ωk =
[
νTk , η
T
k
]T
. Here we select hk = yk, mak-
ing H1 = C, H2 = [0p×n, Ip×p].
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When there is no attack, the system evolves according to
xk+1 = (F +GK)xk −GKek + νk, (54)
ek+1 = (F − LC)ek + νk − Lηk, (55)
yk = Cxk + ηk, (56)
or using the stacked state ξk =
[
xTk , e
T
k
]T
,
ξk+1 = Aξk +Bωk,
yk = [C, 0] ξk + [0, I]ωk,
(57)
with
A =
[
F +GK −GK
0 F − LC
]
B =
[
I 0
I −L
]
. (58)
The OCC ||H||2 criteria specifies the gain from the noise
to the output should be less than a desired value γ¯,
lim
N→∞
√√√√ 1N ∑Nk=1 yTk yk
1
N
∑N
k=1 ω
T
k ωk
=
√
E[yTk yk]
E[ωTk ωk]
≤ γ¯. (59)
Lemma 4 Given the dynamics in (54)-(57), the Output
Covariance Constrained ‖H‖2 constraint in (59) is sat-
isfied if the steady state covariance, P ≥ 0,
P =
[
Px Pxe
PTxe Pe
]
= lim
k→∞
E[ξkξ
T
k ], (60)
satisfies the Lyapunov equation
P = APAT +R, R =
[
R1 R1
R1 R1 + LR2L
T
]
, (61)
and the following inequality holds,
Ck∗ = tr
(
ETx C
TCExP
)
+ tr(R2)
− γ¯2(tr(R1) + tr(R2)) ≤ 0, (62)
where Ex = [In, 0n×n].
Proof: From the definition of the output (56) and of ωk,
we can calculate the quadratic terms in (59),
yTk yk = x
T
kC
TCxk + 2x
T
kC
T ηk + η
T
k ηk, (63)
ωTk ωk = ν
T
k νk + η
T
k ηk. (64)
Taking the expectation,
E[yTk yk] = E[x
T
kC
TCxk] + E[η
T
k ηk]
= tr
(
CTC E[xkx
T
k ]
)
+ tr(R2),
(65)
(recall xk and ηk are independent) and similarly,
E[ωTk ωk] = E[ν
T
k νk]+E[η
T
k ηk] = tr(R1)+tr(R2). (66)
The unknown quantity is then the covariance of the
state, E[xkx
T
k ], which is the first block of the stacked
state ξk covariance Pk = E[ξkξ
T
k ]. This covariance fol-
lows the update, evaluating E[ξk+1ξ
T
k+1] with
Pk+1 = APkA
T +R, (67)
withR defined in (61). Because the matrixA is stable the
covariance converges to an steady value limk→∞Pk = P
which must satisfy the Lyapunov equation (61).
Combining this P with (65)-(66) the OCC ‖H‖2 con-
straint becomes
γ =
√
tr
(
CPxCT
)
+ tr(R2)
tr(R2) + tr(R1)
≤ γ¯. (68)
Rearranging this leads to the condition (62). 
Next we present Lemma 5 to compute the optimal value
of the OCC ‖H‖2 gain and the corresponding optimal
controller and observer gain matrices.
Lemma 5 Given the dynamics in (57), the smallest out-
put covariance constrained ‖H‖2 gain defined by (59) is
γ∗ =
√
tr
(
CP∗xCT
)
+ tr(R2)
tr(R2) + tr(R1)
, (69)
where P∗x = E
T
x P
∗Ex is the state covariance which min-
imizes (69) and is characterized by the optimal gains L∗,
K∗. The solution (L∗,K∗) is found by satisfying the fol-
lowing system of np+mn nonlinear equations,{
tr(CExP
ij
LE
T
x C
T ) = 0, i ∈ 1, n, j ∈ 1, p,
tr(CExP
uv
K E
T
x C
T ) = 0, u ∈ 1,m, v ∈ 1, n. (70)
Here PijL and P
uv
K are functions of L and K given in (?).
Proof: When the minimum value of γ is reached the
inequality (68) changes to equality, which results in (69).
We find the stationary points of (69) with respect to
each element of L and K,
∇γ =
(
∂γ
∂Lij
∂γ
∂Kuv
)
= 0, (71)
which provides a system of np + mn equations. Since
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PijL =
k∗∑
q=0
Aq
0 0
0 J ijL R2L
T + LR2(J
ij
L )
T
AqT − k∗∑
q=1
 q∑
r=1
Ar−1
0 0
0 J ijL C
Aq−rRAqT + q∑
r=1
(
Ar−1
0 0
0 J ijL C
Aq−rRAqT)T

PuvK =
k∗∑
q=1
 q∑
r=1
Ar−1
GJuvK −GJuvK
0 0
Aq−rRAqT + q∑
r=1
(
Ar−1
GJuvK −GJuvK
0 0
Aq−rRAqT)T
 , i ∈ 1, n, j ∈ 1, p
u ∈ 1,m, v ∈ 1, n (?)
tr(R1) and tr(R2) are constants (71) becomes
∂tr(CExPE
T
x C
T )
∂Lij
= tr
(
CEx
∂P
∂Lij
ETx C
T
)
= 0,
∂tr(CExPE
T
x C
T )
∂Kuv
= tr
(
CEx
∂P
∂Kuv
ETx C
T
)
= 0,
(72)
with np + mn different variables as the components of
gain matrices L and K. Thus the system of equations
corresponding to optimal γ can be written in the form
of (70), where
PuvK =
∂P
∂Kuv
and PijL =
∂P
∂Lij
.
Recall the covariance P is the solution of the Lyapunov
equation (61), which can be approximated by the trun-
cated sum
P ≈
k∗∑
q=0
AqRAqT , (73)
which is a function of the gains L and K. Taking deriva-
tives of (73) with respect to Lij and Kuv results in (?).

We implement Lemma 5 with the fsolve command in
MATLAB for (70), using the multi-start option to cast
a wide net for the near-global solution. We reject local
maximums and saddle points by checking ∇2Ωk∗ > 0
(locally for the given answer).
5 Design
In this section we combine the results from the prior two
sections to design the optimal gains L and K to min-
imize the impact of the attack while satisfying a cho-
sen performance criteria. Specifically, the optimal pair
(L, K) is designed to minimize the trace of the minimum
ellipsoid containing the reachable set while maintaining
the OCC ‖H‖2 gain less than an assigned threshold γ¯.
For feasibility the OCC ‖H‖2 gain γ¯ should be selected
to be no smaller than the smallest possible OCC ‖H‖2
gain γ∗, i.e., γ¯ ≥ γ∗. On the other hand, to avoid the
trivial L = 0 and/or K = 0 solution, this desired OCC
‖H‖2 gain should be smaller than the open loop noise-
to-output gain, denoted γ0, i.e., γ¯ < γ0.
Lemma 6 Given the system dynamics (54) and (55),
the open loop (i.e., L = 0 or K = 0) OCC ‖H‖2 gain γ0
is given by
γ0 =
√
tr
(
CPxCT
)
+ tr(R2)
tr(R2) + tr(R1)
, (74)
where the steady state covariance of state Px is the solu-
tion of
FPxF
T −Px +R1 = 0. (75)
Proof. For both L = 0 orK = 0, the state dynamics (54)
are in open loop and thus the evolution of the system is
the same. When L = 0, the state estimate xˆk converges
to zero because the system is open loop stable, but the
actual state xk does not due to the influence of noise.
Thus the open loop state dynamic becomes
xk+1 = ek+1 = Fek + νk. (76)
Similarly, when K = 0, equation (54) directly becomes
xk+1 = Fxk + νk. (77)
With this state equation, the steady state covariance
of the state, Px, is given by (75) and consequently the
performance threshold γ0 should be the same in both
cases. 
Together these limits define the possible range of γ¯ which
we call the trade off interval,
γ∗ ≤ γ¯ ≤ γ0. (78)
For systems with highly stable open loop system matrix
F , this trade off interval is relatively small because γ0
is already relatively small. For systems that are close
to marginal stability (eigenvalues of F close to the unit
circle) the trade off interval is larger. The stability of F
is also a major factor in the size of the reachable set, so
such marginal systems are more sensitive to both noise
and attacks.
Theorem 3 Given the system matrices F , G, C and
performance threshold γ¯ ∈ [γ∗, γ0], zero mean process
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k∗∑
q=1
tr
(
(HTq Hq)(J
ij
L ΣL
T + LCEeP
ij
LE
T
e C
TLT + LΣJ ijTL )
)
2
√
tr(HqLΣLTHTq )
= −λ tr(CExPijLETx CT ),
i ∈ 1, n, j ∈ 1, p
Ee = [0n, In]
(†)
k∗∑
q=1
∑q
r=1 tr
(
2LΣLTHTq (F +GK)
r−1(GJuvK )(F +GK)
q−r)
2
√
tr(HqLΣLTHTq )
= −λ tr(CExPuvK ETx CT ), u ∈ 1,m, v ∈ 1, n (‡)
and sensor noise with covariances R1 and R2, the solu-
tion of (†), (‡) and
tr
(
CExPE
T
x C
T
)
+ tr(R2)− γ¯2
(
tr(R1) + tr(R2)
)
= 0,
(79)
yields optimal gains L∗, K∗ that minimize the attack
impact while satisfying the OCC ‖H‖2 condition.
Proof: The minimum trace ellipsoid that bounds the
reachable set is E(Q∗). We use the trace of the shape
matrix as a proxy for the impact of the attack, i.e., we
aim to minimize
√
tr(Q∗) =
k∗∑
i=0
(
√
α
√
tr
(
HiLΣLTHTi
)
+
√
ν¯tr
(
F iR1F iT
))
,
(80)
which decomposes the ellipsoidal bound on the reachable
set into contributions from the noise and attack.
Remark 2 Because the portion of the impact due to
noise in (80) is not a function of gain matrices L and K,
it does not play a role in minimizing the attack impact. In
addition, the threshold α, which is selected based on the
noise distribution and the detector’s desired false alarm
rate, is also not a function of L and K. Since it appears
as a uniform scaling factor it also does not play a role
in minimizing the attack impact. These are both distinct
advantages for selecting an objective that minimizes the
trace of the shape matrix of the ellipsoid bound (as op-
posed to, e.g., minmizing the volume). This feature is not
present in the convexified version of this problem [14].
From Remark 2, we can reduce (80) to the following
objective function
Jk∗ =
k∗∑
i=0
√
tr
(
HiLΣLTHTi
)
. (81)
This separation of noise and attack and the ability to
remove the threshold α is a special property that comes
from selecting the minimum trace ellipsoid (Lemma 2)
and a cost function to minimize the trace of the el-
lipsoidal bound (other work has used the volume, i.e.,
det(Q∗), as the measure to minimize to reduce attack
impact, e.g., [16]). A consequence of these facts is that
the noise truncation probability p¯ also does not appear
in Jk∗ . This implies that the optimal observer gain and
controller gain can be computed independent from the
choice of truncation used to bound the noise.
We motivated a performance constraint, in this case the
OCC ‖H‖2 constraint, in order to avoid the trivial L = 0
or K = 0 solutions. It is intuitive, and can be seen in
(81), that over the trade off interval γ¯ ∈ [γ∗, γ0] the ob-
jective Jk∗ decreases as, e.g., L approaches zero, how-
ever, the OCC ‖H‖2 gain γ is increasing as it approaches
γ0. Thus we expect for γ¯ ∈ [γ∗, γ0] that the optimal L∗
and K∗ to minimize the attack impact Jk∗ will occur
at γ = γ¯. We use this observation to change (62) from
an inequality to equality Ck∗ = 0, which simplifies the
process of including the OCC ‖H‖2 constraint as a La-
grange multiplier in the optimization,
Ωk∗ = Jk∗ + λCk∗ , γ∗ ≤ γ¯ ≤ γ0. (82)
The necessary condition for a local minimum indicates
that the optimum values of K, L and scalar λ satisfy
∇Ωk∗ =
(
∂Ωk∗
∂Lij
∂Ωk∗
∂Kuv
∂Ωk∗
∂λ
)
= 0, (83)
where the equations in (†), (‡), and (79) correspond to
each term of the gradient being zero, respectively.
Finally, note that the stabilizability and detectability
of the system along with the output covariance being
bounded (ensured by the ‖H‖2 constraint) guarantees
the state covariance to be bounded - hence the optimal
L and K found through this theorem ensure a stable
closed loop system.

As before we use fsolve with (†), (‡), and (79) (with
multi-start option) and numerically ensure the solution
is a minimum.
By increasing the value of γ¯, the optimum value of tr(Q∗)
decreases, which implies a trade-off between the system
performance (OCC ‖H‖2 gain) and security (size of the
reachable set). Recall that for γ¯ ≥ γ0 then L = 0 or K =
0 and the attack has no impact. Note then that the entire
reachable set is determined only by the contribution due
to the noise (the attack portion is zero)
√
tr(Q∗) =
k∗∑
i=0
√
ν¯tr
(
F iR1F iT
)
. (84)
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6 Case Study
We now demonstrate these tools and provide the trade
off curve between system performance and security as
the performance constraint is varied. We consider an LTI
system with matrices,
F =
[
1.04 −0.14
0.30 0.63
]
, G =
[
2 3
1 1
]
, C =
[
2 2
1 2
]
, (85)
R1 =
[
0.018 −0.022
−0.022 0.026
]
, R2 =
[
0.0018 0.0031
0.0031 0.0096
]
,
equipped with a chi-squared detector tuned to a false
alarm rate of 5% (α = 5.99), and with process noise
truncated at p¯ = 95% (ν¯ = 5.99). We select a settling
time of k∗ = 35.
Using Lemma 5, we identify the minimum OCC ‖H‖2
gain γ∗ = 1.57, which is achieved by
L =
[
1.00 −0.97
−0.01 0.26
]
, K =
[
0.14 −2.04
−0.44 1.41
]
. (86)
Using (80) we can then calculate the security metric
based on the set of states reachable by a stealthy zero-
alarm attacker,
√
tr(Q∗) = 16.82 1 . Of the observer and
controller gain matrices that achieve γ∗, here we have
selected the pair with the smallest value of
√
tr(Q∗).
This point is plotted in Figure 4 with a red asterisk (∗).
From Lemma 6, the open loop OCC ‖H‖2 gain γ0 =
10.18.
We now solve Theorem 3 over the trade off interval
γ¯ ∈ [γ∗, γ0] to identify the observer and controller gains
that minimize the attacker’s impact while still satisfying
the OCC ‖H‖2 gain constraint γ¯. In Figure 4, these mini-
mum reachable sets define a curve (black) that quantifies
the fundamental trade off between performance and se-
curity - that demanding improved performance (smaller
γ) necessarily increases the impact an attacker can have
on the system (even if the operator is using the best
choice of observer and controller gains). The optimiza-
tion landscape yields a more difficult problem to solve
as γ¯ approaches γ∗; we were able to find solutions down
to γ¯ = 1.59.
In companion work, we have explored this same idea
through the use of convex optimization and linear ma-
trix inequalities, replacing the geometric approach here
1 Using the convex optimization presented in Theorem 1
of [14], we can confirm that this is indeed the global mini-
mum OCC ‖H‖2 gain and the corresponding L and K (with
smallest reachable set).
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Figure 4. Performance-security curve for the proposed non-
linear Geometric approach (black) compared with two
semi-definite optimization approaches (green), one of which
uses an iterative scheme to eliminate some nonlinearities and
one is fully linearized. The extra steps taken to linearize the
problem make the fully convex optimization feasible only for
a portion of the entire trade off interval.
with a Lyapunov-type method to provide an ellipsoidal
bound on the reachable set [14]. The advantage of a con-
vex optimization approach is the existence of a unique
global optimum and fast computation times, however,
such clean solutions typically require approximations
that add additional conservatism to the results. In this
paper we formulate a nonlinear optimization which may
have a complex optimization landscape with multiple
local minima, however, it does not include any extra
margins of conservatism in the solution. In Figure 4 we
compare the current paper’s geometric approach (black)
with two convex optimization approaches developed in
[14] (green and dashed green). The proposed nonlin-
ear optimization finds observer and controller gains that
constrain attackers to smaller reachable sets than the
LMI approaches. This security advantage is particularly
noticeable at near-optimal performance values (γ close
to γ∗). The geometric approach helps to identify the fun-
damental trade off between security and performance,
highlighting, for example, the fact that giving up a small
amount of performance can lead to a dramatic improve-
ment in security (changing γ¯ from γ∗ to γ∗ + ). This is
less obvious from the convex optimization approaches.
In Figure 5 we compare the ellipsoidal bounds on reach-
able sets between the OCC ‖H‖2 optimal L and K - i.e.,
when γ¯ = γ∗, and two other points on the trade off curve
γ¯ = γ0 (open loop) and γ¯ = 2.11. At γ¯ = γ0, L = 0
and/or K = 0 and the attack impact is at its minimum.
In Figure 5a we plot the entire reachable set bounding
ellipsoid, (80), (noise and attack) and in Figure 5b we
plot the part due only to the attack (81). As discussed,
in open loop the attack contribution is zero (see blue dot
with zero volume in Fig 5b). The entire reachable set is
nonzero due to the noise contributions, which is why in
Figure 4,
√
tr(Q∗) = 8.92 - see (84).
Figure 5 also demonstrates how a relatively small in-
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Figure 5. Comparison of the ellipsoidal outer bound of the
reachable set for γ¯ = γ∗ (red), γ¯ = 2.105 (purple), and
γ¯ = γ0 (blue) due to (a) noise and attack contributions and
(b) only attack contribution. As expected, in open loop the
attack impact is zero.
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Figure 6. For the observer and controller gains in (87) cor-
responding to γ¯ = 2.11, the geometric approach leads to
a tighter ellipsoidal bound on the true reachable set, when
compared with the LMI approach used in [14].
crease in γ¯ (from γ∗ = 1.57, to γ = 2.11), corresponding
to a decrease in performance, is able to reduce the reach-
able set of the system under attack (from the red ellip-
soid to the purple ellipsoid, respectively). For γ¯ = 2.11,
the gain matrices L and K are
L =
[
0.24 −0.21
0.46 −0.40
]
, K =
[
−1.34 −1.70
0.69 0.87
]
. (87)
For this choice ofL andK, in Figure 6 we show a compar-
ison of the tightness of the ellipsoidal bounds provided
by the geometric and LMI tools. The exact reachable set
(gray) is computed using Theorem 1. The geometric ap-
proach (purple ellipse) fits an outer ellipsoidal bound us-
ing Lemma 2. The LMI approach (green) uses the analy-
sis result, Lemma 2, from [14] to find an outer ellipsoidal
bound using a Lyapunov-type method. We observe that
the geometric approach yields a tighter outer bound.
Conclusion
Reachable set computations based on geometric sums
have been explored and developed in the past, e.g., [17].
The new geometric results we present here enable us to
create the optimization to tune to co-design of perfor-
mance, measured by an output covariance constrained
‖H‖2 gain, and security, measured by the size of the el-
lipsoidal bound on the reachable set of attacked states.
The ellipsoidal tools we develop facilitate an elegant sep-
aration - by using the minimum trace ellipsoid - between
contributions based on noise and based on attacks.
We find that by giving up a small amount of closed-loop
performance, we can significantly reduce the vulnerabil-
ity of the system to attack. The geometric approach is
able to recover consistent optimization solutions along
the trade-off interval between optimal ‖H‖2 closed-loop
and open-loop performance. While the alternative ap-
proach provides linear matrix inequalities to be solved,
the relaxations required to convexify the problem ulti-
mately yield poorer solutions, especially as the perfor-
mance criteria is pushed closer to optimal.
At a higher level, our geometric tools provide the exact
boundary of the geometric sum of a number of ellipsoids
and ensure tight ellipsoidal bounds on the exact geo-
metric sum. We believe these results will be valuable for
broader work with geometric sums and reachable sets
outside the realm of security.
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A Novelty of the Minimum Trace Bound
Lemma 2 identified the unique pij parameters that yield
the minimum trace shape matrix for the outer bound of
the geometric sum, p∗ij =
√
tr(Qj)/tr(Qi). For (50) to
be true, there would need to exist an ` ∈ Rn such that
pij =
〈`,Qj`〉 12
〈`,Qi`〉 12
=
√
tr(Qj)
tr(Qi)
, ∀(i, j) ∈ I. (A.1)
Since ` has n elements and is restricted to have unit
length (‖`‖ = 1), there are n − 1 unknowns in (A.1).
For the shape matrices Q1, . . . , Qk, the index set I has(
k
2
)
elements, and by assumption d > n of the k shape
matrices are linearly independent. What we will show
is that d > n linearly independent shape matrices leads
to more equations (constraints) than can be satisfied
through the n− 1 unknowns in `.
To see this, without loss of generality, assume the num-
bering is such that the first d shape matrices are lin-
early independent and define the corresponding index
set Id = {(i, j) | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ d, i, j ∈ N} ⊆ I. The lin-
ear independence means that
d∑
i=1
αiQi = 0n×n ⇒ αi = 0 ∀i ∈ 1, d, (A.2)
i.e., the sum being zero implies that all the coefficients
must be zero. Now we specifically consider the index set
I1 = {(1, j) | 1 < j ≤ d, j ∈ N} ⊆ Id. Over this index
set, (A.1) enumerates d− 1 equations,
〈`,Q1`〉
tr(Q1)
=
〈`,Qj`〉
tr(Qj)
, j =∈ 2, d. (A.3)
We claim all the equations provided by (A.3) are inde-
pendent. To justify this, we show that the functions that
define these equations, i.e.,
fj(`) = `
T
(
Q1 − tr(Q1)
tr(Qj)
Qj
)
`, (A.4)
for j ∈ 2, d are linearly independent, where (A.3) be-
comes fj(`) = 0. These functions are linearly indepen-
dent if
d∑
j=2
βjfj(`) = 0 ⇒ βj = 0 ∀j ∈ 2, d. (A.5)
Note that the functions being linearly dependent re-
quires the sum to be identically zero over all choices of
`. Thus, expanding,
d∑
j=2
βj`
T
(
Q1 − tr(Q1)
tr(Qj)
Qj
)
` = 0, (A.6)
would imply the coefficients must be zero if the functions
are linearly independent. Since this relation must hold
for all choices of `, we can remove the inner product
d∑
j=2
βj
(
Q1 − tr(Q1)
tr(Qj)
Qj
)
=
d∑
j=1
αjQj = 0n×n, (A.7)
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with α1 =
∑d
j=2 βj and αj = −βj tr(Q1)tr(Qj) for j ∈ 2, d.
However, this contradicts the assumption that matrices
Q1, . . . , Qd are linearly independent (A.2). This implies
that the functions fj(`) are linearly independent, which
show that the d− 1 equations in (A.3) are independent
and cannot be satisfied by the n−1 unknowns in ` since
n− 1 < d− 1.
So far we have only considered (i, j) ∈ I1. For the re-
maining choices (i, j) ∈ Id \ I1, we show that they pro-
duce equations that are redundant to those in I1. For
some (i, j) ∈ Id (A.1) is effectively the same as combin-
ing two equations from I1,
〈`,Qi`〉
tr(Qi)
=
〈`,Qj`〉
tr(Qj)
⇔

〈`,Q1`〉
tr(Q1)
=
〈`,Qi`〉
tr(Qi)
〈`,Q1`〉
tr(Q1)
=
〈`,Qj`〉
tr(Qj)
. (A.8)
This demonstrates that there are d−1 independent equa-
tions generated by considering (A.1) over the index set
Id.
Finally we show that including the remaining indices
in the original set I does not introduce any additional
independent equations. By assumption of their linear
dependence, the remaining shape matrices Qi and Qj ,
(i, j) ∈ I \ Id, can be written as Qi =
∑d
r=1 arQr and
Qj =
∑d
r=1 brQr. The relationship between the first d
matrices was established in (A.3) as
〈`,Q1`〉
tr(Q1)
=
〈`,Q2`〉
tr(Q2)
= · · · = 〈`,Qd`〉
tr(Qd)
. (A.9)
Multiplying numerator and denominator by arbitrary
scalars ar and br, r ∈ 1, d, does not change this equality,
a1〈`,Q1`〉
a1tr(Q1)
= · · · = ad〈`,Qd`〉
adtr(Qd)
(A.10)
=
b1〈`,Q1`〉
b1tr(Q1)
= · · · = bd〈`,Qd`〉
bdtr(Qd)
.
Now recall the simple fractional relation that if a/b =
c/d, then (a + c)/(b + d). Using this, we combine the
equations above to show∑d
r=1 ar〈`,Qr`〉∑d
r=1 artr(Qr)
=
∑d
r=1 br〈`,Qr`〉∑d
r=1 brtr(Qr)
(A.11)
〈`,Qi`〉
tr(Qi)
=
〈`,Qj`〉
tr(Qj)
(A.12)
Thus, the remaining equations given by (i, j) ∈ I \ Id
are redundant.
We have now shown that to use (50) to specify the shape
matrix of the minimum trace ellipsoid, it would require
satisfying d− 1 independent equations with n− 1 vari-
ables (in `). When d > n this is not possible and no ` di-
rection can produce the pij coefficients using (51), thus
the family of matrices given by (50) cannot express the
minimum trace shape matrix Q∗. 
B Boundedness of minimum trace ellipsoidal
bound
Lemma 7 If the open-loop state matrix (F ) and closed-
loop state matrix (F + GK) are stable, and input noise
νk and attack input δ¯k are bounded, then the minimum
trace ellipsoidal bound E(Q∗), is bounded.
Proof: In order to prove this fact first we take a trace of
Q∗ as it is introduced in (53).
tr(Q∗) =( ∞∑
i=0
√
αtr
(
HiLΣLTHTi
)
+
√
ν¯tr
(
F iR1F iT
))2
(B.1)
therefore,√
tr(Q∗) =
∞∑
i=0
√
αtr
(
HiLΣLTHTi
)
+
√
ν¯tr
(
F iR1F iT
)
(B.2)
In (B.2) the terms that are inside the series approaches
to zero as i approaches to∞, and according to ratio test.
lim
i→∞
√
αtr
(
Hi+1LΣLTHTi+1
)√
αtr
(
HiLΣLTHTi
) = max(‖λF+GK‖, ‖λF ‖) < 1
lim
i→∞
√
ν¯tr
(
F i+1R1F (i+1)T
)√
ν¯tr
(
F iR1F iT
) = max(‖λF ‖) < 1
(B.3)
where λ, denotes the eigenvalue. This ratio test shows
tr(Q∗) is bounded which means all of the eigenvalues of
Q∗ ( diameters of E(Q∗) ) are bounded, which means
E(Q∗) is bounded. 
C Trivially Minimizing Attack Impact
From (53) but more readily apparent from (23) and (24)
it can be seen that selecting L = 0 or K = 0 is an
attractive choice for minimizing the reachable set due to
attack inputs. More specifically regarding the presence
of random variable δ¯k, (24) suggests that L could be
chosen such that HiLΣ
1
2 = 0, i = 1, 2, ..., k∗, but since
15
Σ is full rank (as a covariance matrix), HiL = 0 which
results to,
GKL = 0, i = 1
GKFL = 0, i = 2
GKF 2L = 0, i = 3
...
GKFn−1L = 0, i = n.
(C.1)
This implies GKF i−1L = 0, therefore, if there exists a
common null space for all matrices GKF i then there are
nonzero L matrices that would yield zero attack impact.
For example, if matrices GK and F have common null
space. Similarly (24) suggests that GK = 0, however if
G is a full rank matrix, K = 0. However, L = 0 and/or
K = 0 are the only generic choices that yield zero attack
impact without system-specific information.
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